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by Professor David Milman
Now that the substantive reforms 
contained in the 1985 86 insolvency 
legislation have had time to bed down, 
the focus of attention of commentators 
has switched to the procedural aspects of, 
and financial constraints upon, enforcing 
these new laws. It is now recognised that 
this was an area which was not adequately 
covered by the Cork Committee (Cmnd 
8558, 1982) in its great study of the 
subject ol insolvency reform.
One of the key aims of the Cork 
Committee was to facilitate actions 
against errant directors who had abused 
the privilege of limited liability. Such 
litigation might be of a private nature, for 
example an action brought by a liquidator 
for wrongful trading or to set aside a 
preference. Alternatively, there could be a 
public element involved in the litigation, 
the best example of this genre being an1 o o
application brought by the DTI to 
disqualify an unfit director. Both types of 
litigation have given rise to procedural 
difficulty and have exposed the 
importance of funding considerations.
LITIGATION TACTICS
When one is litigating on behalf of an 
insolvent company by definition there will be 
limited funds available. Unfortunately, the 
other side will be aware of the restricted 
budget and may stall or initiate procedural 
counter-litigation simply in order to exhaust 
those funds.
USING REALISED ASSETS
As far as private actions are concerned, 
the main obstacle is one of finance. 
When one is litigating on behalf of an 
insolvent company by definition there 
will be limited funds available. In some 
cases there may be sufficient liquid funds 
in the pool of realised assets to justify the 
costs of litigation. Unfortunately, the 
other side will be aware of the restricted 
budget and may stall or initiate 
procedural counter-litigation simply in 
order to exhaust those funds. At an 
opportune moment an application for 
security for costs under the Companies Act 
1985, s. 726 might be made by the 
defendant to put the plaintiff company 
on the spot and so stifle the action.
In dealing with such applications, the 
courts endeavour to balance the interests 
of the parties but effectively stifling the 
claim is often an inevitable consequence 
of ordering security, as they have 
recognised.
INDIVIDUAL CREDITORS
If a liquidator is unable to identify 
funds from internal sources, what other 
options are available? Persuading 
individual creditors to finance the 
litigation is a possibility but there are 
dangers for the creditor here. Firstly, 
there is always the risk that in the event of 
the action failing the court might make a 
costs order against the funding creditor
o o
under the Supreme Court Act 198 1 s. 51.
At the end of the day whether this will 
happen again depends upon the exercise 
of judicial discretion in the context of the 
facts of the particular case but the recent 
ruling of Lindsay J in Eastglen Ltd v Grafton 
[1996] BCC 900 should offer some 
reassurance. Here a third party costs 
order against a funding creditor was 
refused by Lindsay J. The creditor had a 
genuine interest in the litigation, the
o o '
liquidator was acting in good faith and 
the action was only blocked by the 
defendant seeking a security for costs 
order late in the day.
Nevertheless it must be conceded that 
English law offers little in the way of 
incentive for such a supporting creditor. 
We do not permit a funding creditor to 
receive a higher proportion of the 
proceeds of a successful claim than is to 
be awarded to the ordinary creditors of 
the company; the pari passu principle 
rules supreme. Contrast this position 
with that operating in Australia where 
under the Corporations Law, s. 564 the 
court can authorise disproportionate 
distributions of recoveries in favour of 
funding creditors   see for example Re 
Glenisia Investments Ltd (1996) 18 ACSR 
84. Indeed, under this procedure in an 
appropriate case a funding creditor may- 
be permitted to receive 100% of the 
recoveries in settlement of its claim. The 
nearest we can manage in this jurisdiction 
is to permit the liquidator to agree to an
arrangement under which the litigation 
finance becomes a first charge on any 
eventual recoveries, a possibility 
recognised by the Court of Appeal in the 
recent unreported ruling in Katz v 
McNally (which represents but the latest 
stage in the ongoing Exchange Travel saga).
SELLING THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION
Another strategy might be to sell the 
cause of action or the fruits of the action. 
Although it is well established that 
liquidators do enjoy some latitude here 
from the constraints imposed by the bar 
on champerty- and maintenance, that 
freedom has been placed into question by 
two recent decisions.
In Grovewood Holdings v James Capel Si^Co 
[1995] BCC 760 it was held by Lightman 
J that the freedom to sell a cause of action 
in negligence does not encompass the 
right to assign a share of the proceeds in 
return for litigation funding. This case 
has attracted much adverse comment and 
has not been followed by the Australian 
courts   see for example Re Movitor Pty Ltd 
vSims (1996) 19 ACSR 440.
Moreover, certain causes of action are 
vested exclusively in liquidators and even 
outright sale is a matter of controversy. A 
typical example would be the right of a 
liquidator to sue directors for wrongful 
trading under the Insolvency Act 1986, 
s. 214. This cause of action can only be 
pursued by the liquidator. In Re Oasis 
Merchandising Services Ltd [1997] BCC 
282; [1997] 2 WLR 764 the Court of 
Appeal rejected an arrangement under 
which the liquidator assigned the 
potential proceeds of a s. 214 claim in 
return for litigation finance from a 
commercial organisation specialising in 
such arrangements. The court found 
particularly objectionable the aspect of 
this arrangement which allowed the 
funder certain rights of control over the 
litigation because that might compromise 
the independence required of an officer 
of the court in exercising his or her 
statutory powers. Moreover the fruits of 
such an action could not be regarded as 27
28
property of the company and so fell 
outside a liquidator's statutory power of 
sale.
CONDITIONAL FEES
It was hoped that the introduction of 
conditional fees might have an impact 
here. Arrangements under which firms of 
solicitors assume some of the risks of 
litigation were first permitted by the 
Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 
(SI 995/1674) and the Conditional 
Fee Agreements Regulations 1995 
(SI 995/1675). Unfortunately it appears 
that they are not making a major 
contribution by increasing the amount of 
litigation in this field. Ironically it is now 
apparent that this type of risk-sharing 
arrangement has been operating within 
the prolessions on an informal basis for 
many a year and the formalising of the 
practice has not necessarily been viewed 
as a positive move.
THE PUBLIC PURSE
Returning to the second species of 
insolvency litigation the problem of 
money is again beginning to impact upon 
the development of the law.
Although disqualification applications 
are funded by the state, the public purse 
is not unlimited. Hence if the application 
succeeds the respondent director can 
expect to be held liable in costs. Indeed 
some commentators might argue that the 
operation of the disqualification regime is 
now dominated by financial 
considerations. It was such 
considerations that led the National 
Audit Office to press the Insolvency 
Service to increase the number of cases 
on which action was taken in order to 
show that it was providing value for 
money.
'CARECRAFT' PROCEDURE
The inevitable consequence of this is 
that a much greater number of cases are 
now coming before the courts. That 
flood of litigation has of necessity 
spawned cost-saving proposals. The most 
celebrated of these is the 'Carecraft' 
procedure (originating in the judgment 
of Ferris J in Re Carecraft Construction Ltd 
[1993] BCC 336; [1994] 1 WLR 172) 
under which the respondent directors 
and authorities can agree a set of facts 
and 'suggest' to the presiding judge that 
those facts merit the proposed 
disqualification.
To an outside observer this summary 
procedure looks remarkably like a form 
of plea bargaining, but one must always 
remember the inbred sensitivity of the 
English judiciary to such a conclusion 
being drawn. Hence in recent cases they
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have been at pains to reassert their 
ultimate authority. Thus we have been 
reminded that the procedure can only be 
properly used where there is genuine 
agreement as to the facts and that 
consensus must leave no room for 
secondary inferences to be drawn (Re P S 
Banarse S^Co (Products) Ltd [1997] BCC 
425). Moreover, as the Court of Appeal 
emphasised in Secretary of State Jor Trade 
and Industry v Rogers [1997] BCC 155 the 
final disposition of the case (i.e. whether 
a disqualification is to be ordered and the 
length of such a disqualification) is 
entirely a matter for the trial judge; the 
judge is not bound by any private 
agreement between the parties.
This latter case is significant for a 
number of other reasons. First, it makes 
it clear that once a trial judge accepts a 
case under the summary procedure he 
should not add his own 'spin' on the 
agreed facts because to do so would be to 
undermine the basis of the proceedings. 
If he is not prepared to go along with the 
procedure in a particular case he should 
make this clear when presented with the 
papers. The case also provides an 
illustration of the procedure being 
invoked for a more serious case where 
the proposed disqualification of eight 
years fell within the middle range on the 
spectrum of seriousness. Finally, in giving 
the main judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, Scott VC expressed his support 
for the use of formal binding 
undertakings not to act as a director in 
lieu of disqualification proceedings; but 
he indicated that legislation would be 
required here to give such an undertaking 
the same effect as a court order.
LOOKING AHEAD
It is apparent from the foregoing 
survey that issues of finance do pose 
particular difficulties in these areas of 
litigation. However there are signs that 
efforts are being made both by the 
judiciary and the legislature to remove 
disfunctions from the system. Those 
efforts have produced some positive 
changes but more could be done. For 
example, the idea of a public fund to 
finance litigation brought on behalf ofo o
insolvent companies should be given 
some thought. Recoveries could be used 
in the first instance to reimburse the 
public purse. Such a proposal was raised 
in recent law reform reports in Australia 
and New Zealand. The possibility of 
establishing such a scheme at least 
deserves an airing here. Equally, the 
traditional fear of trafficking in litigation, 
which is at the heart of concerns about 
liquidators raising litigation finance 
through various modes of assignment, 
should be cast aside.
The latest signs are "that the required 
change of attitude is beginning to take 
root. On the issue of disqualification 
proceedings, procedural innovations 
should be encouraged and traditional 
judicial fears of case disposition outside 
the courtroom should be reassessed in 
the light of the need for the authorities to
o
be seen to be acting upon reports of 
unfitness and of the requirements of an 
efficient case disposal system. Again, 
there are welcome indications that the 
courts are aware of the possibilities for 
alternative case disposition mechanisms.
However if disqualification cases 
continue to increase and these 
alternatives fail to alleviate matters then 
more radical questions will have to be 
asked about the legal processing of such 
cases. For example, should the court 
system be bypassed altogether in favour 
of a specialist tribunal? Should the 
option of an agreed disqualification 
'through the post' be made available? We 
await developments in this field with 
interest. ©
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